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Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982) propose an incentive-compatible, individually
rational and ex-ante socially optimal direct-revelation mechanism to regulate
a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. We show that their mechanism is not
ex-post Pareto dominated by any other feasible direct-revelation mechanism.
However, there also exist an uncountable number of feasible direct-revelation
mechanisms that are not ex-post Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism. To
investigate whether the BM mechanism remains in the set of ex-post undomi-
nated mechanisms when the Pareto axiom is slightly weakened, we introduce
the -Pareto dominance. This concept requires the relevant dominance rela-
tionships to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs everywhere but at a
set of points of measure , which can be arbitrarily small. We show that a mod-
ification of the BM mechanism which always equates the price to the marginal
cost can -Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at uncountably many regula-
tory environments, while it is never -Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism
at any regulatory environment.
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ciency
JEL Codes: D82; L51
1
1 Introduction
The seminal paper of Baron and Myerson (1982) (BM) was the first study in the
economics literature to introduce a general social welfare function -a weighted sum
of the producer and consumer welfares- to deal with the problem of regulating a mo-
nopolistic firm with unknown costs. This piece of work, along with an earlier study
of Loeb and Magat (1979), also pioneered in characterizing an incentive-compatible
solution to the regulation problem. The regulatory solution of BM was based upon
the well-known Revelation Principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, 1979; My-
erson, 1979; Harris and Townsend, 1981), allowing the regulator to restrict herself
to incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms that require the monopolistic firm to
report its unknown cost information and guarantee that it has no incentive for mis-
reporting.1 Mechanisms considered by BM include four functions (schedules) defined
over the set of possible cost reports: price and quantity functions which must agree
on a given inverse demand curve, a probability function specifying the set of cost
reports at which the monopolistic firm will be permitted to operate, and a subsidy
function specifying the money transfer from consumers to the monopolistic firm. De-
manding these four functions to be incentive-compatible requires that the marginal
welfare of the monopolistic firm -which turns out to be affinely linear in the regulated
quantity of the output under the cost structure assumed by BM- is nonincreasing
in its cost report. In cases the social welfare function puts a lower weight on the
producer welfare than on the consumer welfare, the regulator has an incentive to
1Unlike the mechanism of BM, the incentive scheme offered by Loeb and Magat (1979) does
not use a direct-revelation mechanism that asks the monopolistic firm to report its private cost
information. Instead, it delegates the output decision to the monopolistic firm that is also offered
the right to the whole social surplus. However, the outcome of this scheme -that is optimal only
if the social welfare treats consumers and the producer equally- can be obtained as a special case
of the outcome of the BM mechanism, which is optimal under a general social welfare function
admitting unequal treatments of consumers and the producer as well.
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contract/shrink the quantity schedule in order to limit the producer welfare, con-
sisting of informational rents. However, this contraction would also suppress the
consumer welfare; hence a tradeoff. The regulator optimally balances this tradeoff
by choosing the quantity schedule (and the other three schedules) to maximize the
expected value of the social welfare under her beliefs - about the monopolistic firm’s
unknown cost parameter - over some known support [θ0, θ1].
Since the expected (ex-ante) and the actual (ex-post) values of the social welfare
need not be the same, one may wonder why the regulatory model of BM did not
choose to maximize the actual, instead of the expected, social welfare. The reason
is simply that this is indeed impossible, since at any value θ of the unknown cost
parameter, the informational rents of the regulated firm and consequently the ex-
post social welfare depend not only on the quantity to be produced at the cost level
θ, but also on the part of the quantity schedule over the possible cost reports higher
than θ. To put it in a different way, the value of the quantity at any cost report θ
(marginally) affects not only the ex-post social welfare calculated at θ but also the
ex-post social welfare calculated at any cost report lower than θ, i.e., the interval
[θ0, θ). BM optimally balances such integral effects on the social welfare caused by
the regulator’s choice of the quantity schedule by using her prior beliefs about the
possible cost values, i.e., by choosing a feasible direct-revelation mechanism that
maximizes the expected social welfare (Proposition 1, borrowed from BM 1982).
At this point, we may ask whether there exists a feasible direct-revelation mech-
anism that is ex-post more efficient than the BM mechanism at all values of the
cost information. The answer (we provide in Proposition 2) is ‘no’, since the ex-ante
social efficiency of the BM mechanism implies that it must also be ex-post Pareto
undominated. However, we also show that there exist an uncountable number of
feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are not ex-post Pareto dominated by the
BM mechanism (Proposition 3). Propositions 2 and 3 altogether reveal that one
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can find an uncountable set of feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are ex-post
Pareto non-comparable to the BM mechanism.
The main objective of this paper is to study whether the BM mechanism would
remain to be an ex-post Pareto undominated mechanism if the Pareto concept were
relaxed slightly. To that aim, we introduce a new concept called -Pareto dominance
that requires the relevant dominance relationships (regarding the welfares of the pro-
ducer and consumers) to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs everywhere
but at some points with measure . Using this concept, we show that a modification
of the BM mechanism which always requires marginal cost pricing, irrespective of
the weight of the producer welfare in the social welfare, can dominate the BM mech-
anism at uncountably many regulatory environments (Proposition 4). While this
result is not universally valid for all environments (Proposition 5), the modified BM
mechanism may be argued to be ex-post superior to the original mechanism since the
former is never dominated by the latter at any regulatory environment (Proposition
6).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the regulatory
model borrowed from BM (1982) and Section 3 presents the regulatory mechanism
of BM. Section 4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider the BM’s (1982) model of regulation involving a monopolistic firm with
unknown costs. The firm faces the cost function
C(q, θ) = (c0 + c1θ)q + (k0 + k1θ) if q > 0, and C(0, θ) = 0, (1)
where c0, c1, k0, k1 are known constants satisfying c1 ≥ 0 and k1 ≥ 0. The parameter
θ is restricted to a known interval [θ0, θ1], where θ1 > θ0 ≥ 0.
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The monopolistic firm also faces an inverse demand function which is denoted by
P (.). So, the price at the output level q is equal to P (q). Then, the total value to
consumers of an output quantity q ≥ 0 can be calculated as
V (q) =
∫ q
0
P (q˜)dq˜, (2)
and the consumer surplus as V (q)− P (q)q.
The demand function as well as the form of the cost function and all of its param-
eters other than θ are known to the regulator. While the regulator does not know
the actual value of the cost parameter θ (before the implementation of the regulatory
mechanism), she has (known) prior beliefs about it. These beliefs are represented
by the probability density function f(.), which is positive and continuous over the
known support [θ0, θ1]. Let F (.) denote the corresponding cumulative distribution
function.
3 Baron and Myerson’s (1982) Regulatory Mech-
anism
The regulatory mechanism considered by BM involves the outcome functions (r, p, q, s)
that will be characterized below. After the regulator announces these functions, the
monopolistic firm is asked to report a cost value in [θ0, θ1]. When the reported cost
is θ˜, r(θ˜) is the probability that the monopolistic firm is allowed to operate, p(θ˜) and
q(θ˜) are the regulated price and quantity respectively, and s(θ˜) is the expected value
of the subsidy received by the monopolistic firm, conditional on the probability that
it is allowed to operate.
If the monopolistic firm with the cost parameter θ submits the cost report θ˜, its
expected profits (i.e., the producer welfare) would become
pi(θ˜, θ) =
[
p(θ˜)q(θ˜)− C(q(θ˜), θ)
]
r(θ˜) + s(θ˜). (3)
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A regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, s〉 is called feasible if it satisfies the following conditions
for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]:
(i) r(θ) is a probability function, i.e.,
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1, (4)
(ii) p(θ) and q(θ) agree on the inverse demand curve, i.e.,
p(θ) = P (q(θ)), (5)
(iii) the regulatory policy is incentive-compatible, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ pi(θ˜, θ), for all θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1], (6)
(iv) the regulatory policy is individually rational under truthful revelation, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ 0. (7)
Given a feasible regulatory policy (r, p, q, s), the consumer welfare (the consumer
surplus net of the subsidy paid to the monopolistic firm) and the producer welfare
at any cost level θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] become
CW (θ) = [V (q(θ))− p(θ)q(θ)] r(θ)− s(θ), (8)
and
pi(θ) ≡ pi(θ, θ) = [p(θ)q(θ)− C(q(θ), θ)] r(θ) + s(θ), (9)
respectively. The social welfare SW (θ) is defined as the sum of the consumer welfare
CW (θ) and a fraction of the producer welfare pi(θ). Formally,
SW (θ) = CW (θ) + αpi(θ) = [V (q(θ))− C(q(θ), θ))] r(θ)− (1− α) pi(θ), (10)
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where α ∈ [0, 1] is the (relative) weight of the producer welfare. The objective of the
regulator is to choose a feasible regulatory policy that will maximize the expected
value of SW (θ) in (10), conditional on her prior beliefs f(.) about the parameter θ.
That is, the regulator aims to solve
max
r(.),p(.),q(.),s(.)
∫ θ1
θ0
SW (θ)f(θ)dθ subject to (4)− (7). (11)
To present the solution to the above problem, the following definitions will be nec-
essary. Let
zα(θ) = θ + (1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
, (12)
for any θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], and
hα(φ) = zα(F
−1(φ)) (13)
for any φ ∈ [0, 1]. Define
Hα(φ) =
∫ φ
0
hα(φ˜)dφ˜ (14)
and
H¯α(φ) = convHα(φ), (15)
i.e., H¯α(.) is the highest convex function on the interval [0, 1] satisfying H¯α(φ) ≤
Hα(φ) for all φ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, let
h¯α(φ) = H¯
′
α(φ), (16)
for any φ ∈ [0, 1], and finally define
z¯α(θ) = h¯α(F (θ)) (17)
for any θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
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Proposition 1. (Baron and Myerson, 1982) The solution to the regulator’s
problem in (11) is given by the mechanism (r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯) satisfying equations (18)-(21)
for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]:
p¯(θ) = c0 + c1z¯α(θ) (18)
P (q¯(θ)) = p¯(θ) (19)
r¯(θ) =
 1 if V (q¯(θ))− p¯(θ)q¯(θ) ≥ k0 + k1z¯α(θ)0 otherwise (20)
s¯(θ) = [(c0+c1θ)q¯(θ) +k0+k1θ − p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)(c1q¯(θ˜) + k1)dθ˜ (21)
Proof. See pages 920-921 of Baron and Myerson (1982). Q.E.D.
Note that inserting the optimal subsidy (21) into the producer welfare in (9) at
the optimal regulatory mechanism yields
piBM(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)(c1q¯(θ˜) + k1)dθ˜, (22)
implying that the BM mechanism yields purely informational rents to the regulated
firm due to its private information. Also note that at the optimal regulatory policy
the actual social welfare is given by
SWBM(θ) = V (q¯(θ))− C(q¯(θ), θ)− (1− α)piBM(θ), (23)
implying that the informational rents of the monopolistic firm yields a positive dead-
weight loss in welfare, of the magnitude (1− α)piBM(θ), unless α = 1.
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4 Results
Let Θ = [θ0, θ1]. Given any regulatory mechanism Ψ and any θ ∈ Θ, let SWΨ(θ),
CWΨ(θ), and piΨ(θ) respectively denote the corresponding social welfare, consumer
welfare, and producer welfare at θ.
Definition 1. A regulatory mechanism Ψ (ex-post) Pareto dominates another
regulatory mechanism Ψˆ if CWΨ(θ) > CW Ψˆ(θ) and piΨ(θ) > piΨˆ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Since, we do not consider ex-ante Pareto domination, hereafter we will simply
call ex-post Pareto domination as Pareto domination.
Definition 2. A direct-revelation mechanism of the class (r, p, q, s) is called fea-
sible if it satisfies the feasibility conditions (4)-(7) of BM.
Let MF denote the set of all feasible direct-revelation mechanisms of the class
(r, p, q, s), studied by BM.
Proposition 2. No mechanism in MF Pareto dominates the BM mechanism.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the BM mechanism maximizes∫
θ∈Θ
SW (θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Θ
[CW (θ) + αpi(θ)] f(θ)dθ. (24)
Suppose there exists a mechanism Ψ ∈ MF such that CWΨ(θ) > CWBM(θ) and
piΨ(θ) > piBM(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, we would have∫
θ∈Θ
SWΨ(θ)f(θ)dθ >
∫
θ∈Θ
SWBM(θ)f(θ)dθ, (25)
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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The above result reveals that there is a ground for defending the Bayesian ap-
proach employed by the BM in regulatory mechanism design, because under the
incentive-compatibility and other feasibility conditions, no direct-revelation mecha-
nism, whether it is Bayesian or non-Bayesian, can Pareto dominate the BM mecha-
nism. However, as shown by the next result it is also true that the BM mechanism is
not a Pareto dominant mechanism; i.e., it does not Pareto dominate all other feasible
direct-revelation mechanisms.
Proposition 3. There exists an uncountable number of mechanisms in MF that
are not Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism.
Proof. First, let α ∈ [0, 1). Consider a mechanism Ψ = (rΨ, pΨ, qΨ, sΨ) ∈ MF that
modifies the BM mechanism by changing p¯(θ) = c0 + c1z¯α(θ) in (18) with
pΨ(θ) = c0 + c1[γz¯α(θ) + (1− γ)θ], (26)
where γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, Ψ is characterized by (26) and (19)-(21) subject to the change
of the variables r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯ by rΨ, pΨ, qΨ, sΨ, respectively. Clearly, pΨ(θ) < p¯(θ), hence
qΨ(θ) > q¯(θ) and rΨ(θ) > r¯(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. We have piΨ(θ1) = piBM(θ1) = 0,
but piΨ(θ) > piBM(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1), implying that Ψ is not Pareto dominated by
the BM mechanism.
Now, let α = 1. Consider a mechanism Ψ = (rΨ, pΨ, qΨ, sΨ) ∈MF that modifies
the BM mechanism by changing p¯(θ) = c0 + c1z¯1(θ) = c0 + c1θ in (18) with
pΨ(θ) = c0 + c1[γz¯0(θ) + (1− γ)θ], (27)
where γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, Ψ is characterized by (27) and (19)-(21) subject to the
change of the variables r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯ by rΨ, pΨ, qΨ, sΨ, respectively. Clearly, for all θ ∈
(θ0, θ1] we have p
Ψ(θ) > p¯(θ), implying qΨ(θ) < q¯(θ) and rΨ(θ) < r¯(θ). This
further implies piΨ(θ0) < pi
BM(θ0). On the other hand, we have p
Ψ(θ0) = p¯(θ0),
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and therefore qΨ(θ0) = q¯(θ0) and r
Ψ(θ0) = r¯(θ0). So, CW
Ψ(θ0) = [V (q
Ψ(θ0)) −
C(qΨ(θ0), θ0)]r
Ψ(θ0)−piΨ(θ0) > [V (q¯(θ0))−C(q¯(θ0), θ0)]r¯(θ0)−piBM(θ0) = CWBM(θ0),
implying that Ψ is not Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism. Finally, note
that this conclusion can be reached by uncountably many mechanisms in MF since
γ ∈ (0, 1) and each γ corresponds to a distinct mechanism Ψ. Q.E.D.
The above proposition rests upon two observations about the BM mechanism.
The first is that when α 6= 1, the optimal regulatory price implied by the BM
mechanism is always higher than the marginal cost of the regulated firm to limit
the marginal informational rents (the optimal allowed quantity) of the monopolistic
firm. Evidently, a simple modification to the BM mechanism where the price policy
becomes any weighted average of the BM price policy and the marginal cost pricing
policy, while satisfying incentive-compatibility and other feasibility conditions, would
lead to higher marginal informational rents, hence a higher level of producer welfare
at all values of θ except for θ1. The second observation is that when α = 1, the opti-
mal regulatory price implied by the BM mechanism is always equal to the marginal
cost of the regulated firm, and therefore the informational rents of the regulated firm
are at the highest possible level that can be attained by a feasible direct-revelation
mechanism. However, these maximal rents for the regulated firm imply that the
subsidies that must be paid by consumers are ex-post suboptimally high at low val-
ues of θ. Now, a modification to the BM mechanism could shift the price schedule,
without violating feasibility conditions, to any weighted average of the BM price
policy at α = 1 and the BM price policy at α = 0, to reduce the informational
rents at any cost value. Evidently, this modification would not change the quantity
of output q or the induced gross surplus V (q) − C(q, θ) at the lowest cost value θ0,
since irrespective of α, the BM mechanism always implements marginal cost pricing
at θ = θ0. Therefore, the consumer welfare, which is the gross surplus net of the
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informational rents, would be higher, when θ = θ0, under the modified mechanism
than under the BM mechanism. So, for both when α 6= 1 and when α = 1, one can
find an uncountable number of feasible direct-revelation mechanisms under which the
welfare of either consumers or the producer would be higher, at some values of cost
information, compared to the welfare implied by the BM mechanism. Proposition 2
and 3 altogether establish that there are uncountably many feasible direct-revelation
mechanisms that are Pareto non-comparable to the BM mechanism.
Below, we will investigate whether the BM mechanism would remain to be a
Pareto undominated mechanism if the Pareto axiom were relaxed slightly.
Definition 3. Let λ(.) be the Lebesque measure on < and let  be any real
number such that 0 ≤  < λ(Θ). A regulatory mechanism Ψ is said to -Pareto
dominate another regulatory mechanism Ψ′ if λ(Θ) − λ(Θ∗) ≤  where Θ∗ = {θ ∈
Θ : CWΨ(θ) > CWΨ
′
(θ) and piΨ(θ) > piΨ
′
(θ)}.
The strongest form of domination in Definition 3 is 0-Pareto dominance, where
the measure of the cost values at which the dominance relationships for the consumer
and the producer welfare hold true is equal to the measure of Θ. Note also that 0-
Pareto dominance does not imply, while implied by, the standard Pareto dominance
in Definition 1. Below, we will describe a mechanism that we will Pareto compare
to the BM mechanism under our relaxed domination concept.
Definition 4. Let (rM , pM , qM , sM) denote the modified BM mechanism, which
satisfies equations (28)-(31) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]:
pM(θ) = c0 + c1θ (28)
P (qM(θ)) = pM(θ) (29)
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rM(θ) =
 1 if V (qM(θ))− pM(θ)qM(θ) ≥ k0 + k1z¯α(θ)0 otherwise (30)
sM(θ) =
[
(c0 + c1θ)q
M(θ) + k0 + k1θ − pM(θ)qM(θ)
]
rM(θ) (31)
+
∫ θ1
θ
rM(θ˜)(c1q
M(θ˜) + k1)dθ˜
The essential feature of the above mechanism is that the price is always (for
all values of α) equal to the marginal cost of production, while this would be true
under the BM mechanism only if α = 1. Clearly, the above mechanism is incentive-
compatible since pM(θ) is increasing, and therefore qM(θ) and rM(θ) are decreasing,
in θ over [θ0, θ1]. It is also evident by Proposition 1 that the modified mechanism
cannot maximize the expected (ex-ante) social welfare, which is maximized by the
BM mechanism. The next question we will deal with is whether the modified BM
mechanism can -Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at any regulatory environ-
ment.
Definition 5. We describe a regulatory environment by the list 〈P (.), C(., .), f(.)〉,
involving the inverse demand and cost functions faced by the monopolistic firm, and
the beliefs of the regulator about the private cost parameter of the regulated firm.
Since the model of BM does not specify the inverse demand and belief functions,
their regulatory model presented in Section 2 actually corresponds to a wide class of
regulatory environments according to our definition above. Here, we will continue to
focus on the same class of environments, by keeping all of the structures in Section
2. Before presenting our results, we should finally note that in the case where the
welfares of consumers and the producer are equally weighted in the social objective
(α = 1), the original and the modified BM mechanism lead to the same welfare allo-
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cation at all possible costs. Thus, for the following results we will restrict ourselves
to the case where α ∈ [0, 1).
Proposition 4. Let α ∈ [0, 1). For any  ∈ (0, θ1− θ0), there exist an uncountable
number of regulatory environments at which the modified BM mechanism -Pareto
dominates the BM mechanism.
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1). Pick any  ∈ (0, θ1− θ0). Consider a regulatory environment
〈P (.), C(., .), f(.)〉, where
P (q) = a− q, for all q ∈ [0, a], with
a ≥ min
{
2θ1 − θ0, θ0 + (θ1 − θ0)
2

}
(Assumption-a)
C(q, θ) = θq, if q > 0, and C(0, θ) = 0, for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1],
f(θ) =
1
θ1 − θ0 , for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
We can calculate F (θ) = (θ−θ0)/(θ1−θ0), and F (θ)/f(θ) = θ−θ0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Pick any θ and first consider the modified BM mechanism. The producer welfare
and consumer welfare are given by
piM(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
rM(θ˜)qM(θ˜)dθ˜, (32)
and
CWM(θ) =
[
V (qM(θ))− C(qM(θ), θ))] rM(θ)− piM(θ), (33)
correspondingly. Since the parameters k0 and k1 in equation (1) both become zero
under the assumed cost function, (30) would imply rM(θ) = 1. Then, from (28)
and (29) and using the fact that c0 = 0 and c1 = 1, we have q
M(θ˜) = a − θ˜ for
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all θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Note that Assumption-a implies a > θ1, thus qM(θ˜) ≥ 0 for all
θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Then, equations (32) and (33) respectively become
piM(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
(a− θ˜)dθ˜, (34)
and
CWM(θ) =
(a− θ)2
2
−
∫ θ1
θ
(
a− θ˜
)
dθ˜. (35)
Now, we consider the BM mechanism (18)-(21). We have zα(θ) = θ+(1−α)(θ−θ0),
which is is increasing in θ, hence z¯α(.) = zα(.) from (12)-(17). Moreover, q¯(θ˜) =
a− θ˜ − (1− α)(θ˜ − θ0) for all θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1], from (18) and (19). Assumption-a implies
a ≥ θ1+(1−α)(θ1−θ0), thus q¯(θ˜) ≥ 0 for all θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Moreover, since k0 = k1 = 0,
equation (20) implies r¯(θ˜) = 1 for all θ˜ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. Thus we have
piBM(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
(a− θ˜ − (1− α)(θ˜ − θ0))dθ˜, (36)
and
CWBM(θ) =
(a− θ)
2
(a− θ − (1− α)(θ − θ0))
−
∫ θ1
θ
(
a−θ˜−(1−α)(θ˜−θ0)
)
dθ˜. (37)
Subtracting (36) and (37) correspondingly from (34) and (35), we obtain the welfare
differentials
piM(θ)− piBM(θ) = (1− α)
∫ θ1
θ
(θ˜ − θ0)dθ˜, (38)
and
CWM(θ)− CWBM(θ) = (1− α)(a− θ)
2
(θ − θ0)− (1− α)
∫ θ1
θ
(θ˜ − θ0)dθ˜. (39)
Clearly, piM(θ) − piBM(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1). Also, one can easily check that
CWM(θ)− CWBM(θ) > 0 if and only if θ ∈ (θ∗, θ1] where
θ∗ = θ0 +
(θ1 − θ0)2
a− θ0 . (40)
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Assumption-a implies that θ∗ > θ0 and θ∗ < θ1. Therefore, for all θ ∈ (θ∗, θ1), it is
true that CWM(θ) − CWBM(θ) > 0 and piM(θ) − piBM(θ) > 0. Let Θ∗ = (θ∗, θ1),
and let λ(.) be the Lebesque measure on <. Note that
λ(Θ)− λ(Θ∗) = θ∗ − θ0 = (θ1 − θ0)
2
a− θ0 ≤ 
by equation (40) and Assumption-a. Thus, the modified BM mechanism -Pareto
dominates the BM mechanism. Finally, note that the set of values for the parameter
a satisfying Assumption-a is uncountable. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 suggests that in situations where the outcomes of the modified and
the original BM mechanism are not identical (i.e., α 6= 1), even for arbitrarily small
values of  one can find many regulatory environments at which the modified BM
mechanism -Pareto dominates the BM mechanism. However, the set of these regu-
latory environments is not the universal set, as illustrated by the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Let α ∈ [0, 1). There exist an uncountable number of regulatory
environments at which the BM mechanism is not -Pareto dominated by the modified
BM mechanism for any  ∈ (0, θ1 − θ0) .
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1). Pick any  ∈ (0, θ1 − θ0). Consider the regulatory environ-
ments in the proof of Proposition 4 with Assumption-a being changed to
a ∈
[
2θ1 − θ0, θ0 + (θ1 − θ0)
2

)
(Assumption-b).
That proof showed that for the considered environments the modified BM mecha-
nism -Pareto dominates the BM mechanism only if a ≥ θ0 + (θ1 − θ0)2/. Then,
Assumption-b ensures that the BM mechanism is not -Pareto dominated. Finally,
note that the set of values for the parameter a satisfying Assumption-b is uncount-
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able. Q.E.D.
While the modified mechanism can -Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at
some regulatory environments, it is unable to do so at some others. Despite this,
the modified mechanism can be argued to be superior to the BM mechanism, since
the modified mechanism is not -Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism for any
 ∈ [0, θ1 − θ0).
Proposition 6. Let α ∈ [0, 1). There exists no regulatory environment at which
the BM mechanism -Pareto dominates the modified BM mechanism for any  ∈
[0, θ1 − θ0).
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1). Consider any regulatory environment 〈P (.), C(., .), f(.)〉
satisfying the structures in Section 2, and pick any θ ∈ Θ. Note that
piBM(θ)−piM(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(θ˜)(c1q¯(θ˜)+k1)dθ˜−
∫ θ1
θ
rM(θ˜)(c1q
M(θ˜)+k1)dθ˜ ≤ 0, (41)
since pM(θ˜) < p¯(θ˜), and consequently qM(θ˜) > q¯(θ˜) and rM(θ˜) > r¯(θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ Θ.
So, if Θ∗ = {θ ∈ Θ : CWBM(θ) > CWM(θ) and piBM(θ) > p¯iM(θ)} then Θ∗ = ∅. Let
λ(.) be the Lebesque measure on <. Then,
λ(Θ)− λ(Θ∗) = λ(Θ) = θ1 − θ0. (42)
It follows from Definition 3 that the BM mechanism cannot -Pareto dominate the
modified BM mechanism for any  ∈ [0, θ1 − θ0). Q.E.D.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the ex-post efficiency of the BM (1982) mechanism
that regulates a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. We have showed that the
regulatory mechanism of BM, which maximizes the expected social welfare sub-
ject to some feasibility conditions involving individual rationality and incentive-
compatibility (Proposition 1, borrowed from BM, 1982), is not ex-post Pareto dom-
inated by any other feasible direct-revelation mechanism (Proposition 2), however it
is not an ex-post Pareto dominant mechanism either , for there exists (many) feasible
mechanisms that are not Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism (Proposition 3).
We have next investigated whether the BM mechanism would survive as an ex-
post undominated mechanism if the Pareto dominance notion were to be slightly
relaxed. To that aim, we have introduced the -Pareto dominance requiring the
relevant dominance relationships to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs
everywhere with a possible exception of some points of measure . With regard to this
weakened Pareto concept, a modified version of the BM mechanism which requires
marginal cost pricing at all possible costs is found to dominate the BM mechanism at
an uncountable set of regulatory environments (Proposition 4), though this set is not
as large as the universal set (Proposition 5). Nevertheless, the modified mechanism
may be argued to be superior to the original one for it is never -Pareto dominated
by the original BM mechanism at any regulatory environment (Proposition 6).
Given the problem of selecting a desirable mechanism among infinitely many
feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are ex-post Pareto non-comparable, the
solution devised by BM, which employed a Bayesian regulator endowed with the
objective of maximizing the expected social welfare, is definitely very attractive,
since their approach optimally balances the Pareto tension between the producer
and consumer welfare at different values of cost using the regulator’s beliefs about
the unknown cost information. Nevertheless, the Bayesian approach in monopoly
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regulation, or in mechanism design at large, has been criticized by many economists,
including Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), Vogelsang (1988), Koray and Sertel (1990),
and Laffont (1990), on the grounds of the (un)accountability of the regulator’s prior
beliefs and a related moral hazard problem. Some of these criticisms were formally
investigated by Koray and Saglam (2005), who show how a non-benevolent regulator
in the BM model of regulation can extract rents from consumers or the regulated
firm by manipulating her beliefs to the benefit of either of the two parties. Despite
all criticisms, the BM mechanism is still the best mechanism at hand to deal with
the problem of regulating a single-period monopoly under asymmetric information.
However, as we show in this paper, there exist some regulatory environments where
the use of the BM mechanism might no longer be argued to be indispensable, since at
these environments some other mechanisms may lead to ex-post superior outcomes
for all parties in the society at almost all values of the cost information.
We should finally note that although the special focus of this study has been the
problem of monopoly regulation, all of our results can directly be extended to the
class of principal-agent models considered by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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